We develop the theory of demand for commodities and assets facing incompletely insurable uncertainty. First, a Slutsky matrix decomposes into substitution and income effects the derivative of demand with respect to prices and yield structure. Next, we identify the Slutsky matrix's properties.
Introduction
We develop the theory of demand for commodities and assets facing incompletely insurable uncertainty, given commodity prices, arbitrage-free yield structures, and contingent incomes.
First, a Slutsky matrix decomposes into substitution and income effects the derivative of demand with respect to prices and yield structure, extending Fischer (1972) to multiple commodities.
Next, we identify the Slutsky matrix's properties.
The Slutsky matrix can be perturbed arbitrarily, subject only to preserving these properties, by perturbing the underlying utility's Hessian, while fixing point demand and marginal utility.
The key result identifies these Slutsky perturbations, via linear constraints defined by prices and the yield structure (theorem 2). We also spell out the identification after omission of markets due to Walras' law and price normalization.
The latter two results extend to incomplete markets Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1980) , who introduced Slutsky perturbations.
Finally, we include an algorithm that speeds up the computation of Slutsky matrices.
For arguing genericity, Slutsky perturbations are an alternative to Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci's (1998) first-order conditions approach. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) were the first to apply Slutsky perturbations to the study of generic Pareto improvements with incomplete markets. Since they allowed the central planner to decide the agents' asset portfolios, they did not need to go beyond perturbations to the Slutsky matrices of demand in spot markets. To show why weaker interventions may improve welfare, such as anonymous taxes and changes in asset payoffs, it became necessary to take into account how agents' portfolio adjustments cause a further price adjustment. Naturally, this required perturbing demand in asset markets as well, not just spot markets. The lack of an extension of Slutsky perturbations to incomplete markets remained an obstacle for over a decade 1 , until a breakthrough by Citanna, Kajii, and Villanacci (1998), who circumvented it by analyzing the agents' first order conditions. Researchers have extended the theory of generic Pareto improvements with incomplete markets to many policies by applying this first-order 1 The exception is Elul (1995) . 
The interpretation is that, faced with spot prices p and yield structure W , the household modifies its income w to w + W 0 y(p, W, w) by investing in portfolio y(p, W, w), ultimately financing its state contingent consumption x(p, W, w). Here, a yield structure specifies for each asset j that a buyer is to collect, a seller to deliver, a value W j s in state s, and a portfolio y ∈ R J specifies how much of each asset to buy (y j ≥ 0) or sell (y j ≤ 0), hence yielding W 0 y. For a different emphasis, we may view the assets as having present price q ≡ −W 0 and future yield W 1 ≡ (W s ) s>0 .
Neoclassical demand
For b = (p, W, w) ∈ B, the financeable bundles are 
The following remark hinges on X(b) depending on W 0 only through its span, and on w only through the component that is orthogonal to spanW 0 .
•
where
• Homogeneity
We now recall a subset B 0 ⊂ B for which x(b) exists, is unique and interior. Existence obtains if utility is continuous and X(b) compact; it is well known that X(p, W, w) is compact if and only if W is arbitrage-free, W λ = 0 for some λ ∈ R
S+1
++ . Uniqueness and interiority obtain if utility is strictly quasiconcave in R C *
++ and boundary averse, u(x) > u(x) whenever x ∈ R C * ++ ,x ∈ ∂R C * + , thanks to the convexity of X(b). In sum, neoclassical demand d = (x, y) :
W has linearly independent rows, is arbitrage-free} given the hypotheses on utility of continuity, strict quasiconcavity in R C * ++ , and boundary aversion.
Slutsky matrices
Assumption 1 Debreu's setting for u:
Debreu's special setting means the above strengthened to "D 2 u(x) is negative definite for x À 0."
All three hypotheses assumed to define interior neoclassical demand are present, save for strict quasiconcavity in R C * ++ , which is implied by the first and third ones in Debreu's setting.
Proof. By definition neoclassical demand is the solution to
which exists, is unique, and interior. For now suppose
iff there is λ ∈ R S+1 ++ (necessarily unique) such that
Invertibility follows easily from (F), Debreu's third condition, and W 0 s linearly independent rows. 
Then some open neighborhood O of W preserves the linear independence and admits, by the implicit function theorem, a
(t) − W 0ỹ (t) = w withỹ(t) obviously defined. Writing ∆ t ≡x(t) − x in a second order Taylor expansion about t = 0,
The orthogonality
Since H is symmetric, so is H −1 :
To keep track, S, c are symmetric of dimensions C * + J, S + 1, and m is C * + J × S + 1. We view ρ as playing the role of prices, since ρ = p 0 = p if J = S = 0 (sole budget constraint).
Having defined Slutsky matrices, we develop neoclassical demand theory in two parts. First is demand for a fixed utility: the Slutsky decomposition, the properties of Slutsky matrices, their computation, and the envelope property. Next is demand for a generic utility: identifying the range of perturbations of Slutsky matrices that arise from perturbations of the Hessian of utility.
Fixed neoclassical demand 4.1 Slutsky decomposition
We decompose demand into substitution and income effects, generalizing Gottardi and Hens (1999) to multiple commodities and to including the derivative with respect to asset payoffs. Differentiating the
Multiplying this out,
so that m is the marginal propensity to demand; also, D w λ = c.
Let us interpret the decomposition as substitution and income effects. 
and the substitution effects be
using the chain rule, (decomposition), and D w d = m. Hence the substitution effects are the first summands.
We paraphrase the decomposition to stress the parallel with the traditional one, and to obtain a convenient version for general equilibrium analysis. It says about D q = D −W0 that
That is,
The effect on demand of price changes splits into substitution and income effects, the latter being the product of the marginal propensity to demand with demand itself.
contain the same information, differing only in its display.)
Envelope property
Indirect utility v :
is derived from demand; inversely, according to the envelope property, neoclassical demand is derived from indirect utility:
Proposition 2 Indirect utility is C r−1 in Debreu's setting, and its gradient D b v equals
Proof. v is C r−1 since u, x are, in Debreu's setting. By the chain rule and (F)
Inserting this and
The Slutsky list of properties
What properties do the Slutsky matrices H −1 have? Convenient notations are
X, Y are the marginal propensities to demand commodities, assets. (H) suggests defining functions
The purpose ofH is to study how the
Toward the properties of H −1 , we take as given some µ ∈ R S+1 with W µ = 0. In Debreu's setting, it corresponds to the µ = λ in (F); in Debreu's special setting, to µ = 0. The point is that µ is unrelated We stress that the Slutsky list of properties is exhaustive, in that it recovers all properties of the one object (D 2 u) defining the Slutsky matrices 
Computation of Slutsky matrices
We can compute Slutsky matrices H −1 faster by exploiting the symmetry and sparseness of H.
To keep track, the square A, B, c are symmetric of dimensions C * , J, S + 1, and P C * ×J , X C * ×S+1 , Y J×S+1 .
Algorithm 1 H −1 exists if D is negative definite, and is recursively computable if D is symmetric:
Computing D −1 is the most expensive step, which is cheaper with state separable utility,
because then D is block diagonal and its inverse too
The next properties of the Slutsky matrices must, by theorem 1, already follow from the Slutsky list. ¢ ⊥ , has rank S + 1 − J, and c = cΦc. Lastly,
meaning that, for marginal incomeẇ ∈ spanΦc, marginal demand mẇ is as if asset markets were absent.
Generic neoclassical demand
Equilibrium theory goes beyond demand theory by adding market clearing. Policy theory then adds some policy parameters. By implicitly differentiating market clearing, the envelope property at once gives a formula for the derivative of equilibrium welfare with respect to the policy parameters. Inevitably, this formula contains the Slutsky matrices. So the generic welfare impact of policy is inevitably tied to the generic Slutsky matrices, which we therefore seek to identify.
Slutsky perturbations
A perturbation of the Slutsky matrices is a point ∇ ∈ R dim H . A Slutsky perturbation is one arising Being symmetric, we write
and identify a Slutsky perturbation with a tripleṠ,ṁ,ċ. Our main goal is to identify Slutsky perturbations, without reference to the inversion defining them, in terms of individual constraints on ∇ :
Each of these three independent linear constraints is satisfied by zero, 0 =Ṡ,ṁ,ċ. Thus Slutsky perturbations are characterized as those that satisfy (constraints), affecting S, m, c simultaneously or separately. A proof of theorem from theorem 1 is trivial , if we appeal to
negative definite on σ(x), for all nearbyx ≈ x.
Proof. A matrix D is negative definite on a nonzero subspace σ iff max z∈σ * z 0 Dz < 0, by compactness In sum, the range of ∇ =H(D) −1 − H −1 as D varies symmetrically is the ∇ satisfying (constraints).
Quadratic perturbations
A Hessian perturbation is a symmetric point ∆ ∈ R C * . We just saw which perturbations H 
Proposition 3 (Hessian perturbations identified) If u is in Debreu's setting, so is u (ω,∆t) for all small enough support(ω),t, and then x is the u−demand at b iff it is the u (ω,∆t) −demand at b. Last An argument about generic policy can exchange weighty luggage-quadratic perturbations of utility, first order conditions, and budget identities-for the lighter identification.
Slutsky perturbations as a transversality tool in equilibrium
Here we describe the range of Slutsky perturbations, identified in theorem 2, once the Slutsky matrices have been trimmed due to Walras' law and to a price normalization. The relevance of Walras' law and the price normalization is that equilibrium with real assets is described by as many equations of demand and supply as equilibrating prices, C * − (S + 1) = (S + 1)(C − 1) + J.
Walras' identity implies
The differential (dp, dq) of equilibrium prices with respect to perturbations of the economy, say, arising from policy, depends on the Jacobian of aggregate demand σ 0 = def Σ(x h0 , y h0 )(b(p, q)), according to the implicit function theorem:
provided ∆ is invertible. We can compute the Jacobian ∆ from the above Slutsky decompositions once we realize how budget variables invertible, (dp, dq) exists and depends on the trimmed Slutsky matrices.
Any question about the equilibrium welfare impact of perturbations of the economy involves the differential (dp, dq), owing to the envelope property, proposition 2. Often, the answer to such a question is true only generically in the economy's utility parameters. Arguing such an answer involves the transversality theorem (see Mas-Colell I.2.2). Verifying the rank hypothesis of this theorem then involves the derivative of (dp, dq) with respect to utility parameters; recalling how (dp, dq) depends on the Slutsky matrices, this involves the derivative of the Slutsky matrices S, m, c with respect to utility parameters. If the utility parameters index quadratic perturbations, as in definition 1, then the range of this latter derivative (and this is all that is needed to verify the rank hypothesis) is identified by theorem 2 as the Slutsky perturbations. In sum, Slutsky perturbations allows us to argue properties of equilibrium that are generic with respect to utilities, without having to specify which quadratic perturbations of utility lead to the Slutsky perturbations.
Since verifying the transversality hypothesis involves trimmed Slutsky perturbationsṠ,ṁ,ċ, we describe the correspondence between trimmed Slutsky perturbationsṠ,ṁ,ċ ≈ 0 and Slutsky perturbations. The usefulness of this correspondence is that in proofs we can invoke suchṠ,ṁ,ċ and know that they correspond to quadratic perturbations of utility. The point is that all the information lost by trimming is recoverable from the Slutsky properties (constraints).
Proposition 4 Fix a small enough square matrixṠ ∈ R [(S+1)(C−1)+J]
2 . Then it is the trimmedṠ from a Slutsky perturbation iffṠ is symmetric.
Proof. SupposeṠ is from a Slutsky perturbation. Then by theorem 2 it satisfies the constraints (constraints), hence is symmetric, so the trimmed submatrixṠ is symmetric.
Conversely, supposeṠ is symmetric. We now show how the constraints (constraints), namely ρ 0Ṡ = 0 andṠ is symmetric, imply a uniqueṠ from a Slutsky perturbation. First uniqueness. Use symmetry to
... Conversely, supposeẊW 0 = 0. We now show how the constraints (constraints), namely ρ 0ṁ = 0 anḋ
so that the last row of eachẊ s is determined by the equation p To conclude, it is possible to argue transversality with Slutsky perturbations, which appear naturally in verifying the rank hypothesis of the transversality theorem whenever the underlying system of equations involves the differential (dp, dq), such as in equilibrium welfare analysis. In the case of real assets, the computations facing us involve trimmed Slutsky matrices. The previous two propositions show how to perturb these trimmed Slutsky matrices in a way compatible with unique Slutsky perturbations, hence with local Hessian perturbations of utility.
Proofs

The Slutsky properties
We tie the Slutsky properties to each of three increasingly stringent descriptions of H in (H):
Equivalence 1 Fix a matrix ρ. 6 Suppose M is negative definite on ρ ⊥ and symmetric, and ρ has no kernel (I)
is invertible, with inverse
for some S, m, c satisfying
Conversely, suppose (I'). Then (1') is invertible, with inverse (1), for some M satisfying (I).
We use the convenient notation We now apply the Equivalences to our particular case:
Lemma 2 Suppose M = M (D) with D negative definite on (ρ 1 µ) ⊥ , where ρ 2 µ = 0 and ρ 2 has linearly independent rows. Then M is negative definite on ρ ⊥ .
Proof. 
which is possible by invertibility. Then
Conversely, suppose (I'). Then the invertibility of (1') is established similarly as above. Since 
, we see γ 0 M γ < 0 unless a = ρα for some Since ρ has no kernel, cρ
Conversely, applying (II') to −Mm + ρc = 0:
This and the symmetry of M imply that M is zero off the northwestern corner.
linearly independent rows, I − Y ρ 0 2 = 0.
Equivalence 3
Expressing H −1 as in (*), by definition of inverse we have:
* where " * " denotes the orthogonal projection to ker X ⊥ , but keep a as before.
Lemma 4 If Sρ = 0, S is negative definite on ρ ⊥ , symmetric, then A is negative definite on X ⊥ .
Proof. Fix a and write
By hypothesis on S, a 0 Aa < 0 unless
Proof. of Equivalence 3. Suppose throughout ρ 2 µ = 0. We will appeal twice to the string
The third row implies X 0 DX = c:
⊥ by the (string), so * < 0 by hypothesis on D, unless
Conversely, fix z ∈ R C * and by lemma 3 write z = Aa + Xb with a ∈ X ⊥ , b ∈ ker X ⊥ . Claim:
The second term is zero, since the equations say Aρ 1 c = −P ρ 2 c and ρ 2 c = 0, and so is the third one, since
By lemma 4 and a ∈ X ⊥ , a 0 Aa < 0 unless a = 0. By hypothesis on c and b ∈ ker X ⊥ , b 0 cb < 0 unless
To see this implication, we take the particular b = (ρ 0 1 z) * from the proof of lemma 3, and apply (string) twice, with δ = ρ
Quadratic perturbations
Proof. of proposition 3. Assuming that u (ω,∆) is also in Debreu's setting, the remainder is easy:
Given its interiority, x is the u−neoclassical demand at (p, W, w) iff (F) holds at x and u iff (F) holds at x and u (ω,∆) iff x is the u (ω,∆) −neoclassical demand at (p, W, w). The first and last equivalences hold because u, u (ω,∆) belong in Debreu's setting, and the middle one because Du(x) = Du (ω,∆) (x).
Last but not least, ω ≡ 1 in a neighborhood x ≈ x, where u (ω,∆t) (x) ≡ u(x) + is (as the inverse of a negative definite matrix) and W 0 has no kernel.
Claim: B as defined makes 22, 32 true. 22:
These definitions solve the system modulo A, B, c 0 s symmetry, which does exist: B is symmetric indeed, which implies c is, which implies
